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I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 1884.  The Civil War is over; many farms have been
destroyed and many horses have been killed.  Congress has permitted 
citizens to make claims against the government for the value of horses and 
property lost during the war, and citizens hire agents to represent their
claims before the Treasury Department.1 Wanting to take advantage of this
opportunity, many individuals begin presenting themselves as agents.
Unfortunately, most of them had never appeared before the Treasury
Department, and citizens with valid reimbursement claims are swindled
out of their money.2  This was not an uncommon scenario.  As a result of 
this abuse, Congress passes the Dead Horse Act of 1884, granting the 
Secretary of the Treasury the authority to regulate the admission of agents
representing clients before the Treasury Department.3 
One hundred and thirty years later, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
claims that the Dead Horse Act of 1884 provides it with the authority to
regulate tax return preparers for much of the same reason the statute was
originally passed.4  The IRS is concerned that, like the unqualified agents
 1. See C. John Muller IV, Circular 230: New Rules Governing Practice Before 
the IRS, 1 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 284, 292 (2011). 
2. 	See id. (“The provision was subject to much abuse.”). 
3. The Act provides that “[f]or horses and other property lost in the military
service . . . the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations governing
the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants before his
Department.” Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258 (current version at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330 (2012)). The Act further requires that “such persons, agents and attorneys, before
being recognized as representatives of claimants” must demonstrate “they are of good
character and in good repute, possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to 
render such claimants valuable service.” Id. at 258–59. 
4. The language of the Dead Horse Act of 1884 was amended in 1982, but the 
legislative history indicates Congress did not intend to change the meaning of the 1884 
Act at the time. H.R. Rep. No. 97-651, at 19–20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1895, 1913–14. The term “representative of persons” was substituted for “agents, 
attorneys, or other persons representing claimants,” but it is clear this change was merely
stylistic instead of substantive. See id.; Lawrence B. Gibbs, Loving v. IRS: Treasury’s
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of 1884, unregulated tax return preparers are causing serious problems 
such as taxpayer noncompliance and the increasing tax gap.5  In 2011, the
IRS began implementing regulations in an attempt to combat these 
problems.6  However, in recent opinions, the D.C. District Court and D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals have ruled that the Dead Horse Act of 1884 does 
not grant the IRS the power to regulate tax return preparers.7  Accordingly,
the courts permanently enjoined the IRS from implementing the regulations.8 
In order to combat the problem of taxpayer noncompliance and to
decrease the tax gap, the IRS has decided it is time to regulate tax return
preparers.9  Regulations may be the answer to these problems, but the
specific regulations the IRS wants to implement may overpenalize tax
return preparers.10  This Comment argues that tax return preparers should
be regulated but Congress needs to enact legislation that would limit the
penalties and align them with those already in place for tax return preparer
misconduct. Part II outlines the background surrounding the regulations 
and the reasons the IRS decided to implement the regulations 130 years 
after it was supposedly granted the authority to do so.  Part III summarizes 
the specific regulations and the arguments against them, and discusses the
problem of overpenalization.  Part IV reviews the recent legal battle
regarding these regulations and analyzes why the courts in Loving v. IRS 
made the right decision.  Part V advocates for Congress to enact legislation 
authorizing regulations of tax return preparers while limiting the penalties 
that may be imposed. 
Authority To Regulate Tax Return Preparers, 141 TAX NOTES 331, 332 (2013); Steve R.
Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Preparation, 59 VILL. L. REV.
515, 520 (2014). 
5. See Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return
Preparation, 139 TAX NOTES 767, 769–70 (2013).
6. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-6, 2011-3 I.R.B. 317–318 (providing guidance regarding the
implementation of the regulations). 
7. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013, 
1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the language of the 1884 statute does not apply to tax 
return preparers because they do not “practice” before the Treasury Department and
therefore, the IRS lacks the authority to impose regulations).
8. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 81. 
9. See infra Part II.B. 
10. See infra Part III.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND
Prior to 2011, tax return preparers were not held to any legal
standards.11  There was no test they had to take to demonstrate they
understood the current tax laws or knew the ethical standards expected of 
them.12  There was no registration process to determine how many people
claimed to be tax return preparers.13  Anyone could set up a tax return
preparer business with little to no knowledge of how to file a tax return, 
and any person who was not licensed to practice before the IRS could 
prepare taxes for a fee without being subject to regulations.14 
A. Who Is Considered an Unregulated Tax Return Preparer
An unregulated tax return preparer is someone who charges a fee for 
preparing taxes but is not an attorney, certified public accountant, or
enrolled agent.15  Attorneys and certified public accountants are licensed
by their state, and enrolled agents are certified to practice before the IRS.16 
These tax professionals are all regulated by Circular 230.17  However, it 
11. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 4832, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW 1 
(2009) [hereinafter I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832], http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/54419l09.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8UFR-LBEM].
12. Although tax return preparers were largely unregulated, they were still 
accountable for their misconduct.  It was not the wild west of taxes; if tax return preparers 
were guilty of misconduct, they were subjected to penalties under the Internal Revenue 
Code. See I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695, 7206, 7207, 7404 (2012).  Tax return preparers did have
boundaries prior to 2011, even though they were not necessarily considered “regulated.” 
See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 1; see also infra Part II.C (summarizing the 
penalties tax return preparers faced prior to 2011). 
13. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 7. 
14. In today’s society, it has become increasingly more convenient for anyone to 
claim they are a tax return preparer.  For as little as $119.95, anyone with a computer can
purchase tax preparation software and make such a claim. See Olson, supra note 5, at 769. 
“There are no longer any barriers to entry to becoming a tax return preparer.”  Id.
Although, in theory, tax return preparers could set up shop without having ever prepared
a tax return before, it is unlikely they will stay in business for long; the free market 
economy would likely prevent unqualified tax return preparers from becoming successful
because their reputations would suffer.  See David Brunori, Government Power, Cronyism,
and the IRS Running Amok, 134 TAX NOTES 1599, 1600 (2012). 
15. Attorneys, certified public accountants, and enrolled agents are collectively
known as “practitioners,” and are subject to federal regulations because they are granted
the authority to “practice” before the Department of the Treasury. See 31 U.S.C § 330(a)
(2012); 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.2, 10.3 (2013). 
16.  I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 8. 
17. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2013) (containing “rules governing the recognition of 
attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents”); see infra Part III.A.1.
236
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is unregulated tax return preparers, and not the tax professionals, who
have become the main concern of the IRS’s contested regulations.18 
It is unknown exactly how many people claim to be tax return 
preparers.19  Therefore, it is impossible to determine how many of them
obtained the requisite education, knowledge, training, or skill before 
charging their clients a fee for preparing taxes.20  In the 2011 tax year, of
the 142 million individual tax returns filed, approximately 79 million 
taxpayers paid someone to prepare their taxes and over 42 million of those 
returns were prepared by an unregulated tax return preparer.21  The IRS
estimated the number of unregulated tax return preparers was about 
600,000 to 700,000 that year22 and, as a result, concluded tax return
preparers must be regulated to ensure they do not harm the taxpayers who 
employ them or interfere with the IRS’s ability to efficiently carry out its 
duties.23 
B. Why the IRS Decided To Regulate Tax Return Preparers
Taxpayers hire professionals to prepare their taxes because the tax code
is very complex.24  When taxpayers pay someone to prepare their taxes, it
is implied that the tax return preparer has an understanding of tax law and
its complexities.25  However, recent studies show that this might not be the
 18. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 1; see Olson, supra note 5, at 769– 
70. 
19. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 1. 
20. See id.
 21. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 61 (2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p2104.pdf [http://perma.cc/9L7T-Z5WT].
22. Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 32,286, 32,299 (proposed June 3, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
23. See Olson, supra note 5, at 767–68 (“[S]ignificant concerns have been raised
about incompetent and unscrupulous preparers and their negative impact on taxpayers and 
tax compliance.  If a preparer makes inflated claims that the IRS later rejects, or fails to 
claim benefits to which the taxpayer is entitled, the taxpayer suffers.  If a preparer makes 
inflated claims that the IRS does not detect, federal revenue collection suffers.”).
24. Id. at 769. 
25. There have been approximately 4680 changes to the tax code since 2001. 
1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/ 
2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/KZ4R-9F6F].  Interestingly,
this averages out to be more than one change per day. Id.  This figure, however, does not 
include changes made after December 28, 2012, and is an understatement because multiple 
changes to a section are often grouped together and counted as a single entry. Id. at 6 n.10. 
 237
OYER FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2018 11:12 AM      
 
 















   
 
     
  
    
  
   
  
   
   
        
   
    
  
   
case.26 In its 2009 report recommending implementation of tax return
preparer regulations, the IRS cited two government studies and the 
increasing tax gap as evidence that the regulations could help encourage 
taxpayer compliance.27 
1. Government Accountability Office Study 
In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a 
study of the services offered by paid tax return preparers and found that
preparers working for commercial chain preparation companies, such as 
H&R Block, made serious errors.28  The study targeted nineteen offices of 
commercial tax return preparation firms in major metropolitan areas.29 
Although its ultimate recommendation was simply that the IRS needed to
conduct more research to determine how accurately paid tax preparers 
were following the tax code, the study’s findings were enough to raise 
serious concerns.30  For example, only two out of the nineteen tax return 
preparer offices studied calculated the correct tax liability and refund 
amounts.31  In fact, all nineteen of the offices prepared some tax returns
that contained a mistake,32 which is especially concerning because tax 
return preparers are a “critical quality-control checkpoint for the tax 
system.”33  Even though the study was not conclusive, it revealed the need 
to regulate the tax preparation industry.34
 26. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
27. See id. In both studies, auditors posed as taxpayers and sought assistance from 
tax return preparers in filing their taxes. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN.,
NO. 2008-40-171, MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED
PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 2  (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/audit
reports/2008reports/200840171fr.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y85M-4VKQ]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN
PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS 3 (2006), http://www.gao. gov/assets/120/113330.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/AH3X-25EF]. 
28. U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at Introduction. 
29. Id. at 3. The auditors who posed as taxpayers did not visit any certified public 
accountants or attorneys.  Id. Even though the study was not directed at unregulated tax 
return preparers, it can be inferred that most of the tax return preparers were largely 
unregulated.
30. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 13. 
31. U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 23. 
32. Id. at 31.  According to the IRS, if the tax returns prepared in the course of this 
study were real and the IRS detected the mistakes, the preparers would likely have faced
civil sanctions. See id. at 26. For example, several tax return preparers encouraged the auditors
not to report side income that would have resulted in an understatement of tax liability; 
this conduct could have resulted in fines of up to $1000 for willful or reckless disregard
for tax laws. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)–(b) (2012); U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 27, at 26. 
33. U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 29. 
34. See id.
238
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2. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Study 
The IRS also relied on the 2008 Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration’s (TIGTA) study to support its implementation of the 
regulations.35  The study specifically targeted unregulated tax return 
preparers instead of just commercial chain preparers.36  Much like the
GAO study, TIGTA’s study found significant errors among tax return
preparers visited by the auditors.37  Auditors visited twelve commercial 
chains and sixteen small, independently owned tax preparation offices.38 
The study found that of the twenty-eight returns that were prepared, only
eleven were correct.39  The most troubling finding was that 35% of the
returns contained mistakes the IRS would have considered substantial 
enough to warrant sanctions,40 indicating the IRS’s regulations were 
justifiable. Ultimately, the study recommended the IRS develop regulations
that require all paid preparers to have a single identification number so the 
IRS can track their activities and better understand their effect on taxpayer
noncompliance.41 
3. Tax Gap
Furthermore, the IRS is concerned that taxpayer noncompliance is 
contributing to the increasing tax gap.42  The tax gap is simply the 
35. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 6; TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 26. 
36. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 16. 
37. See id. at 5.
 38. Id. at 2. Each of the tax return preparers visited used commercial tax 
preparation software to assist in filling out the tax return, and some relied on this software
to make eligibility determinations based on the information that the taxpayer provided to
the preparer.  I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 15. 
39. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 5.  The scenarios 
the auditors presented to the tax return preparers were not considered to be difficult tax 
situations.  Id.  In fact, the situations were “specific, straightforward, and not dependent 
on interpretation”; they were designed to mirror real life scenarios. See id. at 3.
 40. See id. at 5, 9.  Similar to the GAO study, the IRS concluded that if these returns 
had been real, it would have found that the mistakes constituted a “willful or reckless”
disregard for tax laws under the Internal Revenue Code and would have imposed
sanctions. See I.R.C. § 6694 (2012); I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 16, 17; supra
note 32. For example, in some cases the tax return preparers increased deductions without 
permission from the taxpayer even after the taxpayer questioned whether they were 
entitled to the deduction.  I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 16. 
41. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 18. 
42. See Olson, supra note 5, at 771. 
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difference between taxes that are legally owed and taxes that are paid on 
time.43 The IRS believes the main cause of the tax gap is taxpayers
misreporting their income and therefore paying fewer taxes.44  The fact 
that a majority of taxpayers rely on a tax return preparer to file their 
income tax indicates preparers are helping taxpayers misrepresent their
income.45  Tax return preparers also contribute to the tax gap by 
misinterpreting complex tax laws, failing to exercise due diligence, and
directing taxpayers to misrepresent their income.46  The concern over the
increasing tax gap is just one of the reasons the IRS feels compelled to 
impose regulations on tax return preparers.47
 43. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2013-IE-R008, THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NEEDS TO IMPROVE THE COMPREHENSIVENESS, ACCURACY,
RELIABILITY, AND TIMELINESS OF TAX GAP ESTIMATES 1 (2013), http://www.treasury. 
gov/tigta/iereports/2013reports/2013IER008fr.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EM5-VSU8]. The 
tax gap was most recently reported in 2012 for the 2006 tax year. Id. at 4. The IRS 
reported the tax gap was $385 billion between the taxes owed and taxes not collected. Id. 
at 5. The difference between taxes owed and taxes not voluntarily collected—before the
IRS enforcement activity—was $450 billion. U.S. IRS ‘Tax Gap’ Could Be More Accurate — 
TIGTA Report, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/09/16/usa-tax-gap-idUSL2N0HB0IN20130916 [http://perma.cc/SZ46-5EDD].
44. See  JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42739, TAX GAP, TAX
COMPLIANCE, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 2 (2012), http:// 
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42739.pdf [http://perma.cc/8WWM-G7TR]. 
45. Both the GAO and the TIGTA studies reported that tax return preparers 
understated the auditor’s income, which resulted in a decreased tax liability that would
have resulted in penalties.  See supra notes 32, 40 and accompanying text. 
46. See Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer 
Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, in 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 44, 69–70 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc_2007_ vol_2.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2RAR-WDHD] (discussing the importance of understanding the source 
of errors found on tax returns and how a better understanding of the role unregulated tax 
return preparers play in the tax gap is vital).
47. See BICKLEY, supra note 44, at 8.  Although the studies relied on by the IRS
and the growing tax gap weigh in favor of implementing regulations on tax return 
preparers, it is important to note that there is not enough information known about 
unregulated tax return preparers to reach a conclusion about the role they play in taxpayer
noncompliance. See Book, supra note 46, at 47.  Even the studies themselves concede this
issue. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 12 (“Although
paid preparers file the majority of income tax returns, the IRS has limited information on
them and insufficient means by which to track or monitor them.” (footnote omitted)); U.S
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 30 (“We recommend that the 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue conduct necessary research to determine the extent
to which paid preparers live up to their responsibility to file accurate and complete tax 
returns . . . .”). Additionally, others have advocated for more research in order to 
determine the best course of action for regulating tax return preparers.  See Book, supra
note 46, at 74 (discussing the inconclusive nature of research concerning how paid 
preparers affect tax compliance); see also Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., It’s About Time:
Registration and Regulation Will Boost Competence and Accountability of Paid Tax 
240
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C. Oversight of Tax Return Preparers Prior to 2011 
Although unregulated tax return preparers were not subject to federal 
regulations prior to 2011, they were subject to existing civil penalties 
under the Internal Revenue Code and in some cases to criminal sanctions.48 
These penalties are the IRS’s “key tool” against noncompliant tax return
preparers and can be imposed for a variety of tax law violations.49 
The Internal Revenue Code imposes civil sanctions for tax return 
preparers who misrepresent a taxpayer’s information.50  For example, 
Internal Revenue Code § 6694(a) penalizes a tax return preparer that 
understates a taxpayer’s liability where the tax return preparer knew, or 
reasonably should have known, the understatement was the result of an
“unreasonable position.”51 For each violation, the tax return preparer can 
face fines of up to $1000 or 50% of the tax return preparer’s income
derived from the return, whichever is greater.52  Under § 6694(b), if tax
return preparers make a “willful attempt in any manner to understate the 
liability for tax on the return” or recklessly disregard any of the rules or 
regulations, they face a $5000 fine.53  Additionally, under § 6695, the tax
return preparer can be penalized for failing to provide the taxpayer a copy
of his or her return, failing to sign the return and provide an identifying 
number, failing to retain a copy of the return, or failing to be diligent in 
determining eligibility for earned income credit.54  The penalty is $50 per
failure to comply, but the maximum penalty imposed cannot exceed
$25,000 with respect to each violation.55 
Preparers, 31 VA. TAX REV. 471, 522–23 (2012) (discussing how previous studies on tax
return preparers and their effect on tax payer compliance lack reliable data).
48. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing the broader statutory context and the already enacted penalty
scheme under the Internal Revenue Code); I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 17–18; 
U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 10–11. 
49. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 9.
 50. See I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695, 6701, 6713 (2012). 
51. An “unreasonable position” means that the understatement of a taxpayer’s 
liability was due to a position “that had no realistic possibility of being sustained.”  U.S
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 10. 
52.  I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1)(B). 
53. Id. § 6694(b). 
54.  I.R.C. § 6695. 
55. Id. These are just a few examples of civil penalties that tax return preparers are 
subject to.  Others include civil penalties for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax
liability, which can result in fines up to $1000, and improper disclosure or use of return
 241






















      
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
         
 
Criminal sanctions can also be imposed for improper conduct.56  For  
example, a tax return preparer that willfully prepares a false or fraudulent 
return may be held liable, and violations can result in up to $100,000 in
fines and three years imprisonment.57  Additionally, tax return preparers 
can be punished for knowingly or recklessly disclosing tax return 
information, and violations can result in fines up to $10,000 and one year 
imprisonment.58  Civil and criminal sanctions can be imposed for the same
violation.59 
The Internal Revenue Code also provides the authority to enjoin tax 
return preparers.60  Consequently, the IRS can bring a civil action in
district court “to enjoin any person who is a tax return preparer from 
further engaging in [certain] conduct.”61  If the court finds tax return 
preparers have engaged in any conduct that would subject them to civil
penalties or criminal sanctions, the court can enjoin them from engaging 
in such conduct.62  The court may also enjoin tax return preparers from
preparing any tax returns if the preparers’ conduct is particularly 
egregious or if the preparers have been punished previously for the same
misconduct.63 
III. THE REGULATIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS
A. The Regulations
The IRS has tried to implement various regulations designed to curtail 
the negative effects of unregulated tax return preparers in response to the 
information, which can result in fines up to $250 for each disclosure.  I.R.C. §§ 6701, 6713
(2012).
56. See I.R.C. §§ 7206, 7207, 7216 (2012). 
57.  I.R.C. § 7206. 
58.  I.R.C. § 7207. 
59. I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 18; U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 27, at 10–11. 
60.  I.R.C. § 7407 (2012). 
61. Id. § 7407(a). 
62. See I.R.C. § 7407(b)(2); United States v. Cruz, 611 F.3d 880, 887 (11th Cir.
2010) (denying the IRS’s request to permanently enjoin the tax return preparer because 
less stringent penalties would have sufficed instead, after the tax return preparer brought 
evidence showing he no longer engaged in misconduct). 
63. I.R.C. § 7407(b)(2). This is the most severe penalty tax return preparers can
face under the Internal Revenue Code’s penalty scheme.  The permanent injunction that 
can be assessed is referred to as the “death penalty” in the profession of tax return
preparers. See Ariel Alvarez, The Constitutionality of the Inevitable Regulations of All 
Tax Return Preparers, 14 J. ACCT., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 735, 746 (2013).  The severity of
the penalty corresponds to the extent and nature of the wrongdoing.  Id. 
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growing concerns about their accuracy and accountability.64  The goals of
the regulations are twofold—increase taxpayer compliance and ensure
high ethical standards for tax return preparers.65  These regulations include
implementation of the ethical standards found in Circular 230, mandatory
registration, continuing education, and competency testing.66 
1. Circular 230 
Under the regulations, all tax return preparers will be held to the ethical
standards found in Circular 230.67  Circular 230 outlines a standard of
conduct that originally only applied to certain tax professionals who were 
certified to represent their clients in administrative hearings.68  However, 
in 2007, Circular 230 was expanded to include all attorneys, certified 
public accountants, and enrolled agents who provided any written tax 
advice to their clients.69  In 2011, the IRS amended Circular 230’s
definition of practitioner to include “registered tax return preparer.”70 
This new definition includes the category of tax return preparers previously
64. “After consideration of the input provided through the public comment process, 
the IRS believes that taxpayers, tax administration and the tax professional industry and 
related service providers will be better served through the implementation of a number of
changes in how the industry participants are overseen.”  I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 
11, at 2.
 65. See Tolan, supra note 47, at 484 (discussing the “twin goals” behind the 
implementation of the regulations). 
66. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 33–35, 37. 
67. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.3, 10.36 (2013), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
TREASURY DEP’T CIRCULAR NO. 230: REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2011); see I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 37. 
68. See Alvarez, supra note 63, at 747. 
69. In 2007, Circular 230’s definition of practice was expanded to include 
“rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan or arrangement, or 
other plan or arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.”  Bryan T.
Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457, 461 (2013).  Because
the purpose of hiring a tax attorney, certified public accountant, or enrolled agent is to
obtain tax advice, this broader definition of practitioner means that Circular 230 now 
regulates nearly every action taken by these tax professionals.  Id. at 461–62. 
70. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.2, 10.3 (2011); Muller, supra note 1, at 301.  The definition 
of registered tax return preparer will include “any individual who is compensated for
preparing, or assisting in the preparation of, all or substantially all of a tax return or claim
of refund of tax,” but a registered preparer’s practice is “limited to preparing tax returns . . . 
and other documents for submission to the Internal Revenue Service.”  Muller, supra note 
1, at 301 (quoting Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 
75 Fed. Reg. 51,713, 51,727 (proposed Aug. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 
10)). 
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excluded in the definition because the IRS now requires every paid tax
return preparer to register.71  The proposed changes to Circular 230 
attempt to create a registration process for tax return preparers that would
require preparers to obtain a preparer tax identification number (PTIN),
pass an eligibility examination, and participate in continuing education 
72courses.
2. Registration
The new regulations require every paid tax return preparer to register
with the IRS and obtain a PTIN.73  In order to obtain a PTIN and register,
tax return preparers will be charged a “reasonable nonrefundable fee” and
required to provide this number when they sign tax returns.74  Prior to the
regulations, tax return preparers were required to sign each return and 
provide an identification number, such as a social security number or a
PTIN.75  The IRS claims that mandatory registration through PTINs will 
help collect more data on the accuracy of paid tax return preparers.76 
3. Continuing Education
The regulations also require tax return preparers to participate in fifteen
hours of continuing education each year.77  The fifteen hours must be 
composed of three hours of federal tax law, two hours of tax ethics, and 
ten hours of other specialized federal tax law topics.78  The IRS believes 
71. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-6, supra note 6; Muller, supra note 1, at 301. 
72. See Alvarez, supra note 63, at 749 (discussing the changes made to Circular 
230 in order to regulate tax return preparers). 
73. I.R.S. Notice 2011-6, supra note 6 (“[A]ll individuals who are compensated for
preparing, or assisting in the preparation of, all or substantially all of a tax return or claim
for refund of tax must have a PTIN.”). 
74.  I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 33. 
75. See I.R.C. § 6109(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person required under the authority of 
this title to make a return, statement or other document shall include in such return,
statement, or other document such identifying number as may be prescribed for securing 
proper identification of such person.”); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.609–2, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,309, 
60,315 (Sept. 30, 2010). 
76. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 33.  Registration would help to 
combat the problem of not having enough information because a registration system would 
allow the IRS to collect data and make determinations of what regulations should and 
should not be implemented. See supra note 47. 
77. 31 C.F.R. § 10.6 (2011). Those who provide continuing education services
must be an accredited educational institution and must be recognized by the IRS as a 
“professional organization, society, or business whose programs include offering
continuing professional education opportunities in subject matters within section 10.6(f) 
of Circular 230.”  See I.R.S. Notice 2011-61, 2011-31 I.R.B. 91.
 78. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 36. 
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all tax return prepares have an obligation to keep abreast of tax laws and 
this requirement will ensure better compliance with consistently changing 
laws.79  This requirement, however, does not include attorneys, certified 
public accountants, or enrolled agents because they are already required 
to complete continuing education to maintain their professional licenses.80 
4. Eligibility Examination 
Additionally, the new regulations require tax return preparers to pass an 
eligibility exam.81  To prevent an interruption of business and ease the
transition, the IRS allows tax return preparers three years to complete the 
competency testing requirement.82  There are two levels of testing that tax 
return prepares can choose from: (1) wage and nonbusiness tax returns, 
and (2) wage and small business tax returns.83  Tax return preparers must 
pass the competency test before they can register with the IRS and obtain 
a PTIN.84  Again, attorneys, certified public accountants, and enrolled 
79. Id. at 35–36; see also Olson, supra note 5, at 771–72 (“Tax law has evolved so 
that competently advising a taxpayer and accurately preparing even the simplest return 
require an extraordinary exercise of judgment and knowledge by the return preparer.  The 
code provisions applying to family status are as complex as those relating to depreciation 
of business property or passive activity losses.”).
80. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 36.  But see Kelly Phillips Erb,
Attorney Who Bested IRS in Tax Preparer Regulation Case Speaks Out, FORBES (Jan. 22, 
2013, 10:56 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2013/01/22/attorney-
who-bested-irs-in-tax-preparer-regulation-case-speaks-out/ [https://perma.cc/3UUX-7WVL?
type=pdf] (describing how attorneys are exempt from eligibility and continuing education
requirements and are considered competent tax return preparers based on their status as an 
attorney and irrespective of their familiarity with tax law).
81. See T.D. 9527, 2011-27 I.R.B. 2–3 (June 3, 2011); I.R.S. Notice 2011-48, 2011-
26 I.R.B. 927. 
82. T.D. 9527, supra note 81, at 2–3. The IRS invited the public to comment on
the implementation of the competency testing requirement.  I.R.S. Notice 2011-48, supra
note 81, at 927.  Commentators requested that the IRS delay the implementation of the 
testing requirement until the regulations were already in place.  T.D. 9527, supra note 81,
at 5.
 83. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 53 app. I (showing competency
examination content for each examination category).
84. Id. at 35.  Additionally, when a tax return preparer applies to take the
competency exam, the IRS will perform a suitability check, which may “include criminal
background checks and tax compliance checks.” Id. at n.82.  A tax compliance check will
be limited to a “review of the tax return preparer’s filing and payment compliance history.”
Id.
 245
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agents do not have to satisfy this requirement because they already passed
competency tests to obtain their professional licenses.85 
B. The Opposition 
Not everyone agrees with the IRS’s implementation of the regulations
on tax return preparers.86  In fact, some independent tax return preparers 
and commercial chain preparer firms oppose the regulations.87  The  
opposition has valid objections concerning the form and substance of the
requirements, including their cost and training measures.88  Some tax  
return preparers are concerned that the expense of implementing the
regulations will be too burdensome.89  There is also concern that the 
training measures are duplicative because many tax return preparers
already undergo rigorous training.90 
1. The Regulations Are Expensive 
Tax return preparers affected by the regulations will be faced with many 
new fees.91  For example, the cost of registering with the IRS will be
 85. See T.D. 9527, supra note 81, at 5 (“Other categories of . . . practitioners are
generally subject to state requirements that result in the individual possessing a minimum
level of experience, knowledge, judgment, and maturity.”); supra text accompanying note 
80. 
86. See Alvarez, supra note 63, at 750. 
87. See Tolan, supra note 47, at 513. 
88. See Alvarez, supra note 63, at 750–51.  Of course, some of the concerns that 
have been raised are typical complaints that arise any time a systematic change is imposed
upon a large group of people.  See id.  Opposition is bound to happen when the government 
decides to require an entire profession to pay a fee in order to continue practicing their 
profession legally. See Tolan, supra note 47, at 513. 
89. See Katherine Pickering, Written Testimony of Katherine Pickering, Executive 
Director of the Tax Institute at H&R Block and Vice President of Government Relations,
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight: Hearing




91. See Tolan, supra note 47, at 513–14.  The cost of the regulations is a major 
concern and small independent tax return preparation firms are not the only ones that are
worried.  H&R Block has voiced its concerns and estimates it will cost over $23 million 
annually to implement the regulations—costs that will inevitably be passed down to the 
taxpayer.  See Pickering, supra note 89, at 3–4.  The National Association of Tax
Professionals (NATP), a group that represents 20,500 regulated and unregulated preparers,
is also concerned with the costs imposed by the new regulations. See PAUL CINQUEMANI,
NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX PROF’LS, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW INITIATIVE—A RETROSPECTIVE
2, 7–8 (2011), http://www.natptax.com/TaxKnowledgeCenter/taxpreparerregistration/Documents/
Discussion%20Paper%20b4%20House%20Subcommittee%20on%20Oversight%20July%
2028.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9N2-G57G?type=pdf].  The NATP suggests the costs of the 
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$64.25 per year.92  However, in order to register, a tax return preparer must 
be fingerprinted and pass a background check, the combined cost of which 
is approximately $90.93  In addition, tax return preparers are now required 
to pass a competency test and participate in fifteen hours of continuing 
education every year.94  Although there is no set fee for the competency
test or the continuing education hours, similar tests for enrolled agents
cost about $97 and classes cost anywhere from $5 to $25 per credit hour.95 
In total, a tax return preparer could end up paying more than $500 per year 
in fees. For small, independent tax preparers that prepare only a handful 
of tax returns each tax season, this amount could prove too burdensome
for them to remain in business.96 
2. The Requirements Are Duplicative 
There is also concern that the regulations are duplicative because 
training programs that ensure tax return preparer competency already 
exist.97  For example, national commercial tax preparation chains have 
education programs and competency testing programs for their employees.98 
H&R Block requires its tax return preparers to take eighty-four hours of 
classroom instruction in addition to homework, quizzes, a midterm, and a 
final exam.99  It also requires its employees to participate in twenty-four 
hours of continuing education each year.100  H&R Block’s education and 
competency requirements far exceed the IRS’s requirements; however, its 
employees must still participate in the IRS’s competency tests and abide 
regulations will be most devastating in remote or rural locations, where there are only one
or very few tax return preparers in business during the tax season.  Id. at 8. 
92. Id. at 7. 
93. Id.; see also Alvarez, supra note 63, at 751 (“[I]t would be a shocking waste of 
time and resources if the effect of the new requirements were to create less compliance by
taxpayers who are forced to file their tax returns without assistance.”).
94.   I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 34–35, 36. 
95. Cinquemani, supra note 91, at 8.
 96. See infra Part IV.A. 
97. See Tolan, supra note 47, at 514–15. 
98. Id. at 515. This objection carries a lot of weight because the number of tax 
return preparers who work for large commercial chain preparers is substantial, and all 
commercial chain preparers require at least some sort of training. See Alvarez, supra note 
63, at 751. 
99. Pickering, supra note 89 (manuscript at 2). 
100. See id. But see Tolan, supra note 47, at 515 (suggesting the regulations will 
cause H&R Block to cut down on its own training to avoid duplicative costs). 
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by its education requirements.101  This renders the competency testing and 
education requirement unnecessary for H&R Block’s 97,000 tax return
preparers.102 
C. The Problem of Overpenalization 
Tax return preparers may be subject to overpenalization if the 
regulations are implemented because there are safeguards already in place
to ensure tax return preparer accountability.103  The penalties tax return
preparers face under the Dead Horse Act of 1884, if they are subject to
such regulations, significantly overlap with the specific penalty scheme
found in the Internal Revenue Code.104  Additionally, the penalties prescribed
under the new Circular 230 are harsher than already existing penalties.105 
One area of overlap within the penalty schemes can be found in § 7407 
of the Internal Revenue Code and section 330(b) of the Dead Horse Act 
of 1884.106  Section 7407 provides the authority to enjoin tax return
preparers from engaging in illegal conduct or from preparing taxes at
all.107  Section 330(b) grants the IRS authority to disbar any tax return
preparer who is “incompetent” or “disreputable” or who “violates
regulations.”108  However, § 330(b) does not require the same level of
judicial oversight that the Internal Revenue Code provides.109  Thus, it
 101. Pickering, supra note 89 (manuscript at 3).  H&R Block initially supported the 
Paid Tax Return Preparer Initiative, assuming that H&R Block’s “training and testing
program would be accepted by the IRS, and that [it’s] certified tax preparers would be
waived from the IRS Competency exam.” Id.  Further, there has previously been
“bipartisan support for H&R Block’s competency testing to be certified for IRS purposes.” 
Id.
102. See id. But see Alvarez, supra note 63, at 751 (explaining that “[w]hether the 
large business chain preparers adequately train their own employees or not has no bearing
on the need to monitor all of the other preparers who do not undergo such professional
preparation”).
103. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
104. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (2012) (outlining the general penalty scheme 
found within the Dead Horse Act of 1884), and Regulations Governing Practice Before
the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286, 32,292 (proposed June 3, 2011) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10) (outlining the penalties imposed under Circular 230), with 
I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695, 6713, 7216, 7407 (2012) (outlining the specific statutory scheme
found within the Internal Revenue Code).
105. See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76
Fed. Reg. at 32,286. 
106. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (highlighting the intersection between the Internal 
Revenue Code’s penalty scheme and the discipline standards under 31 U.S.C. § 330(b)).
107.  I.R.C. § 7407. 
108.  31 U.S.C. § 330(b). 
109. Compare I.R.C. § 7407 (“A civil action in the name of the United States to
enjoin any person who is a tax return preparer . . . .”), with 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (“After 
248
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will be easier to disbar tax return preparers than it will be to enjoin them 
from engaging in certain misconduct because the IRS will not have to deal 
with the formality of bringing the case to a district court.  Disbarment is a 
more serious penalty than enjoinment because it threatens to prevent tax
return preparers from practicing their chosen profession.110  Therefore, the
IRS should not be able to impose the penalty of disbarment without more 
stringent judicial oversight. 
Additionally, under Circular 230, tax return preparers will be subject to 
harsher penalties than under the Internal Revenue Code.111  For example, 
Circular 230 penalizes tax return preparers for understating liability even 
if it is ultimately eliminated in a different portion of the return.112 
However, under Internal Revenue Code § 6694(d), if another portion of 
the return eliminates the understatement, the tax return preparer does not 
receive a penalty.113  Similarly, Circular 230 provides no reasonable cause
defense for an understatement of liability, whereas § 6694(a)(3) states, “if 
it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement,” then the
penalties will not be imposed.114  There is potential for overpenalization 
if tax return preparers are subject to Circular 230’s penalties because they 
leave less wiggle room for mistakes.115  The Internal Revenue Code
accounts for these mistakes and provides relief for a tax return preparer’s
unintentional errors.  However, if Circular 230’s penalties apply to tax 
notice and opportunity for a proceeding, the Secretary may suspend or disbar from practice 
before the Department . . . .”). 
110. Disbarment is defined as “The expulsion of a lawyer from the bar or from the 
practice of law, usu. because of some disciplinary violation; the official act by which an
attorney is deprived of the privilege of practicing law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 561
(10th ed. 2014).  Enjoin is defined as “[t]o legally prohibit or restrain by injunction.” Id.
at 647. 
111. See Muller, supra note 1, at 304. 
112. Compare Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 
76 Fed. Reg. 32,286, 32,292 (proposed June 3, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10) 
(explaining that elimination of a tax understatement by a secondary position on the tax
return will still result in penalties), with I.R.C. § 6694(d) (2012) (stating that “at any time 
there is a final administrative determination or a final decision that there was no 
understatement of liability,” any assessment of penalties “shall be abated”). 
113.  I.R.C. § 6694(d). 
114. Compare Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service,
76 Fed. Reg. at 32,307 (lacking a reasonable-cause defense to penalties), with I.R.C. §
6694(a)(3) (2012) (“No penalty shall be imposed . . . if it is shown that there is reasonable 
cause for the understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith.”). 
115. See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76
Fed. Reg. at 32,307. 
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return preparers, then overpenalization could occur for simple mistakes
made on tax returns that tax return preparers otherwise would not be held
accountable for.116 
IV. LOVING V. IRS
Not surprisingly, just a few months after the IRS began implementing
the new regulations, Sabina Loving, Elmer Kilian, and John Gambino— 
three independent tax return preparers—sued the IRS,117 challenging its
statutory authority to impose such regulations.118 
A. The Plaintiffs 
Sabina Loving, the named plaintiff, owns a small tax preparation office 
in an impoverished neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago.119  The
cost of implementing the IRS’s regulations would likely force Loving to 
raise her prices.120  Her low-income clients would be unable to afford her
services, and as a result, she would likely go out of business.121 
Elmer Kilian lives in a small town in Wisconsin.122  Every tax season 
for the past thirty years he hung a sign outside his house advertising his 
tax preparation services.123  Kilian prepared around eighty to one hundred 
tax returns every year.124 The cost of the regulations would have
 116. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3), (d). 
117. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. 
Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-00385), 2012 WL 5356606 [hereinafter Complaint]. 
118. Id.
119. Kelly Phillips Erb, Tax Preparers Speak Out Against New Regs, File Suit 
Against IRS, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kelly
phillipserb/2012/03/13/tax-preparers-speak-out-against-new-regs-file-suit-against-irs/ [https:// 
perma.cc/W4BU-KD5Y?type=pdf].  After the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s ruling, Sabina Loving stated, “[M]y customers—not the IRS—should be 
the ones who get to choose who prepare their taxes.  I have a right to earn an honest living
without getting permission from the IRS.” Matthew Barakat, IRS Loses Appeal on New 
Rules for Tax Preparers, YAHOO (Feb. 11, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/irs-
loses-appeal-rules-tax-preparers-174447027.html [https://perma.cc/42JA-8QXV?type=image].
120. Challenging the IRS’s Authority To License Tax Return Preparers, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://www.ij.org/irs-tax-preparers-backgrounder-2 [http://perma.cc/A75W-N5QA] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2015).
121. See id.
 122. Id. Kilian is a retired Korean War veteran and often prepares free tax returns
for charity. See Erb, supra note 119. 
123. See Challenging the IRS’s Authority To License Tax Return Preparers, supra
note 120. 
124. See Erb, supra note 119. 
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outweighed his profit margin and he would no longer be able to provide 
his services.125 
John Gambino is a Certified Financial Planner who primarily assists his 
clients with wealth management services.126  As a convenience, he often 
prepared their taxes.127  Gambino prepared about fifty tax returns a season
for compensation.128  However, under the new requirements, it would no
longer be profitable for him to offer this service.129 
B. The Legal Battle 
The facts of the case are simple and straightforward.  The plaintiffs were
previously unregulated tax return preparers who believed the IRS lacked
the statutory authority to enact and enforce the new regulations. The 
plaintiffs brought suit against the IRS,130 seeking injunctive and 
125. See Challenging the IRS’s Authority To License Tax Return Preparers, supra
note 120. 
126. See Erb, supra note 119. 
127. See id.  Although the IRS does exempt certified public accountants, attorneys, 
and enrolled agents from the regulations, it does not exempt Certified Financial Planners 
(CFPs). See generally Letter from Kevin R. Keller, Chief Exec. Officer, Certified Fin. Bd.
of Standards, Inc., to Internal Revenue Serv. (July 7, 2011), http://www.cfp.net/docs/ 
public-policy/irs_notice_2011-48_letter8B185F4D644A.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [http://perma.cc/VPQ2-
N32P].  However, CFPs professional standards are similar to those necessary to become a
CPA. Id.  For example, in order to gain certification, CFPs must complete coursework 
and a rigorous examination in financial planning, which covers federal income tax laws 
and related tax subjects. Id. The CFP Board believes these requirements should be enough 
to exempt CFPs from the regulations.  Id. 
128. See Erb, supra note 119. 
129. See Challenging the IRS’s Authority To License Tax Return Preparers, supra
note 120.  The plaintiffs were represented by the Institute of Justice, a libertarian public
interest law firm. Id.  The lead attorney, Dan Alban, has voiced his opposition to the IRS’s 
implementation of the regulations since 2010.  See Dan Alban, The IRS and the Latest 
Licensing Outrage, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/
10/08/the-irs-and-the-latest-licensing-outrage/ [http:// perma.cc/JW8Q-JSTG].  He testified at a
congressional hearing on the matter that the regulations would disproportionally hurt small tax
return preparation businesses and independent preparers. Id.  Alban believes higher
regulatory costs and a corresponding decrease in competition will likely increase the cost
of tax preparation services overall.  Id.; see also Erb, supra note 119 (discussing how 
Alban was the only one expressing opposition at the 2010 congressional hearing). 
130. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012).  The Administrative
Procedure Act applies to all administrative agencies and procedures, and governs any
administrative unit with substantial independent authority, such as the IRS, in the exercise
of specific functions.  73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 8 (Supp. 
2013). 
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declaratory relief to prevent the IRS from implementing these new
regulations.131 
Both the plaintiffs and the IRS claimed the statutory language of 31 
U.S.C. § 330 pointed in their favor.132  As a result, both parties moved for
summary judgment.133  Generally, summary judgment requires the moving
party to show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and
that the moving party is therefore “entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”134  However, in cases where the court is reviewing a final agency
action, summary judgment serves to decide, as a matter of law, whether
the administrative record supports the agency action.135  Here, the court
had to apply this standard of review to determine whether the IRS had the
authority to enact and enforce the regulations.136 
There was no dispute by either party that the Administrative Procedure 
Act was the controlling law in deciding this issue.137 A challenge to an
administrative agency’s rulemaking requires the reviewing court to “set
aside agency action” that is “in excess of [the agency’s] statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations.”138  In order to determine if the agency action 
was outside the scope of the IRS’s statutory authority, the court had to 
decide whether the regulations were “consistent with the Congressional 
purposes underlying the authorizing statute.”139  The court employed the
two-step approach of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. to analyze the scope of authority under the 1884 Dead Horse 
131. Complaint, supra note 117, at 21.  Additionally, plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees 
and any other legal or equitable relief.  Id. 
132. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 27–31, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. 
Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-00385-JEB), 2012 WL 8133439; Defendants’
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7–11, Loving v. IRS, 
917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-00385-JEB), 2012 WL 8133440. 
133.  Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2013). 
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
135. See, e.g., Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1472
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]his case involves review of a final agency determination under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; therefore, resolution of this matter does not 
require fact finding on behalf of this court.  Rather, the court’s review is limited to the 
administrative record . . . .”). 
136. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
137. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 14; Defendants’
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 
2013) (No. 1:12-cv-00385-JEB), 2012 WL 8133441. 
138.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012). 
139. Bensman v. Nat’l Park Serv., 806 F. Supp. 2d 31, 40 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding the 
language of the Freedom of Information Act unambiguously required the Service to make 
a determination within twenty working days).
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Act.140  The first step was to examine whether “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”141  Where the intent of Congress
is clear and unambiguous, there is no reason to go any further.142 However, 
if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, then the court must move 
on to the second step of Chevron and decide whether the agency’s action
was “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”143  The plaintiffs
argued that the statute was unambiguous in that it did not grant the IRS 
the authority to regulate tax return preparers.144  The IRS argued that the
language of the statute was ambiguous because the terms practice and 
representative were not defined by the Dead Horse Act and could be 
interpreted broadly.145 
The court focused on whether the IRS had the statutory authority to
regulate previously unregulated tax return preparers.146  This issue turned
on statutory interpretation, specifically on whether the statute unambiguously
provided the IRS with the authority to regulate under step one of
Chevron.147 
1. What Does It Mean To “Practice?” 
The court’s analysis began by examining “the language of the statute 
itself” to determine the plain meaning of the term practice and whether 
tax return preparers “practice” before the IRS when they file a tax 
140. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 840–41 (1984)). In Chevron, the petitioners filed for review of the Clean Air Act
promulgated by the EPA.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841.  The issue was whether the EPA’s 
action was based on a reasonable construction of a certain statutory term. Id. at 840. The 
court formulated a two-part test to determine if deference should be granted to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statutory term.  Id. at 842–43. 
141. Id. at 842. 
142. Richard M. Lipton, ‘Tough Loving’: District Court Invalidates IRS Regulation 
of Return Preparers, 118 J. TAX’N 200, 202 (2013). 
143. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
144.  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 16. 
145. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 132, at 15–16. 
146. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2013). 
147. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”); Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74. 
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return.148  The court determined this issue fell under the first step of the
Chevron inquiry and whether Congressional intent was clear and
unambiguous.149  If the term practice was deemed unambiguous, the IRS 
would lose at Chevron step one and the plaintiffs would prevail.150 
The IRS argued that the statute did not define what it means to practice 
before the Treasury Department151 and this made the meaning of the
statute and Congress’s intent ambiguous because the term practice has a
broad meaning.152  The IRS argued the inquiry must move beyond step
one of Chevron because the statute “does not ‘unambiguously foreclose’
the Secretary’s regulation of paid tax return preparers.”153 Furthermore, 
the IRS contended that tax return preparers had been allowed “limited 
practice” before the IRS because they were allowed to represent their 
clients if the IRS later audited their clients’ tax returns.154  Therefore,
because Congress had not specifically addressed the issue of whether or 
not tax return preparers practice before the IRS and yet preparers were
permitted “limited practice” prior to the new regulations, the statute was 
ambiguous and the inquiry should move to the second step of the Chevron
analysis.155 
On the other hand, the plaintiffs argued practice does not apply to tax 
return preparers because they do not represent their clients “in adversarial
 148. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012) (stating in relevant part that the “Secretary of the 
Treasury may regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of 
the Treasury”); Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
149. See Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (“The battle here will be fought and won on 
Chevron step one.”).
150. See Lipton, supra note 142, at 202. 
151. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 15 (“The
challenged regulations pass step 1 because Congress did not unambiguously define the
term ‘practice’ before the Department of the Treasury or otherwise expressly determine 
whether the preparation of tax return constitutes ‘practice.’”).
152. Id. The dictionary’s definition of practice is “to exercise or pursue an 
employment or profession (as medicine or law) actively.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1780 (1993).
153. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 15 
(“Chevron step 1 ends the analysis only ‘if the statute unambiguously forecloses the 
agency’s interpretation.’” (quoting Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432 
(D.C. Cir. 2012))). 
154. Rev. Proc. 81–38, 1981–35 I.R.B. 12 (“[A]n individual preparer of tax returns 
may exercise, without enrollment, the privilege of limited practice as a taxpayer’s 
representative before the Internal Revenue Service.”); 31 C.F.R § 10.7(c)(2) (2013) (“[A]n
individual who is not a practitioner may represent a taxpayer before the Internal Revenue 
Services.”); Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 24. 
155. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 15–16. 
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proceedings before the Treasury.”156  Instead, they merely prepare and file
tax returns for compensation.157  The plaintiffs claimed, “‘practice’
connotes the conduct of trained professionals, such as attorneys.”158 This
argument is reinforced by the context of the statute, such as the list of
requirements “representatives” must possess in order to practice, including 
“good character” and “good reputation.”159  Furthermore, the statute also
requires that “representatives demonstrate competency to advise and assist 
persons in presenting their cases.”160  The term  case signifies that the 
representative will present “an adversarial proceeding of some kind.”161 
Based on its plain meaning and textual clues found within other provisions 
of the statute, the plaintiffs convincingly argued the term practice was not 
meant to include tax return preparers.
The court was persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument and found the 
statute “unambiguously foreclosed” the IRS from regulating previously
unregulated tax return preparers.162  The court concluded the IRS “hurrie[d]
through Chevron step one” and labeled this approach “simplistic.”163 
156.  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 18. 
157. See id.
 158. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines practice of law as “[t]he professional work
of a lawyer, encompassing a broad range of services such as conducting cases in court, 
preparing papers necessary to bring about various transactions from conveying land to
effecting corporate mergers, preparing legal opinions on various points of law, drafting
wills and other estate-planning documents, and advising clients on legal questions.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (10th ed. 2014). 
159. 31 U.S.C § 330(a)(2) (2012).  These requirements are very similar to the 
requirements attorneys must possess to be admitted to the bar and ultimately to practice
law. The American Bar Association recommends that the standard character of a lawyer 
is to show conduct that “justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, and others with 
respect to the professional duties owed to them.” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS &
AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS viii (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds., 
2014), http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RT8B-DWGV?type=pdf].
160. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 132, at 21. 
161. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 21. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines case as “[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action suit, or controversy at
law or in equity.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (10th ed. 2014). 
162. The court has no difficulty siding with the plaintiffs in this case because the 
IRS’s argument was somewhat strained. See Lipton, supra note 142, at 205.  The IRS 
should have recognized that the term practice has a well-established meaning. Id. 
163. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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Furthermore, the court found “[f]iling a tax return would never, in normal 
usage, be described as ‘presenting a case.’”164  The court held the plain 
meaning of the statute was unambiguous, which meant there was no
reason to go beyond the first step of the Chevron analysis because it was
clear from the textual clues that Congress did not intend to include tax
return preparers among those who practice before the IRS.165 
2. Broader Statutory Context 
The court also referenced the broader statutory context to determine 
whether Congress intended to unambiguously preclude regulation of tax 
return preparers.166  In determining whether Congress has addressed the
specific issue, as required by Chevron’s first step, the reviewing court
“should not confine itself to examining the particular statutory provision
in isolation.”167  Instead, the court must to look at the broader statutory 
scheme because the meaning of certain terms might “only become evident 
when placed in context.”168 The court in this case needed to determine
whether or not the broader statutory context supported the notion that the 
IRS was acting outside the scope of its statutory authority when it enacted
new regulations.169 
The plaintiffs argued that the overall statutory scheme indicated Congress’s
intent was not to grant the IRS plenary authority to regulate tax return
164. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D) (2012); Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (“At the time 
of filing, the taxpayer has no dispute with the IRS; there is no ‘case’ to present.  This
definition makes sense only in connection with those who assist taxpayers in the 
examination and appeals stages of the process.”).
165. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74. 
166. See Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 75.  When interpreting statutes, the inquiry “must
cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent.’”  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)) (holding that the plain meaning of the
legislation should be conclusive).  The ambiguity of the statutory language can be
determined by reference to “the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson, 519
U.S. at 341 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992))
(holding that the statutory language is ambiguous as to whether it excludes former 
employees).
167. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)
(holding that the Congress had directly spoken on the specific issue and precluded the 
FDA from regulating tobacco products). 
168. Id.  A fundamental canon of statutory interpretation is that “the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.” Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); see also Brown v.
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional 
possibilities but of statutory context.”).
169. See Loving, 917. Supp. 2d at 73–74. 
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preparers.170  Since 1884, Congress has passed several statutes offering 
specific and limited grants of authority when it believed it was necessary
to empower the IRS to regulate tax return preparers.171  For example, 
Congress passed several statutes contained in the Internal Revenue Code 
that govern the penalties tax return preparers could face for various acts 
of misconduct.172  If Congress believed the IRS had plenary authority to
regulate tax return preparers, it likely would not have enacted these
specific statutes.  Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that if section 330(b) 
applies to tax return preparers, then § 7407 of the Internal Revenue Code 
would be rendered surplusage.173  The broader penalty scheme found in
section 330(b) would allow the IRS to circumvent the judicial protections 
found within § 7407.174  If Congress believed the IRS already had the 
power to disbar tax return preparers, the plaintiffs questioned why
Congress would feel the need to enact a specific statute granting the IRS
limited authority to permanently enjoin tax return preparers.175 
The IRS argued the 2009 Tax Return Preparer Review exposed the need 
for “greater regulatory oversight despite the numerous statutory provisions.”176 
The IRS pointed out that the purpose of the penalties outlined in the
Internal Revenue Code was completely different from those found in
 170. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 35. 
171. Id.  Congress’s most recent grant of specific authority to the IRS to regulate tax 
return preparers was in November 2009 when it mandated the use of e-filing by all tax
return preparers who file more than ten returns.  I.R.C. § 6011(e)(3) (2012). 
172. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695, 6713, 7216 (2012). 
173. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 35. 
Additionally, plaintiffs also argued the IRS’s own interpretation of the statute undercuts 
its interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330.  Id. at 36.  Interestingly, the IRS has had the authority
to regulate for 130 years, but it just now realized it has the statutory authority to implement
these regulations without making any legislative changes. See, e.g., Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n 
v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding it significant that only
in the last five years of the statute’s sixty-five year history did the agency claim the 
statute’s language affords it the authority to regulate).
174.  Section 7407 was passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and allows the 
Treasury Department to file a civil action to “enjoin any person who is a tax return preparer 
from further . . . acting as a tax return preparer.”  I.R.C. § 7407 (2012); Tax Reform Act 
of 1976, § 1203, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1522, 1693 (1976); see Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 38.
 175. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(“[T]he meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress 
has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.”). 
176. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 30–31;
I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 8. 
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Circular 230.177  Circular 230 is meant to “ensure practitioners are ethically 
and competently fit to practice” before the IRS.178  On the other hand, the
penalties found in the Internal Revenue Code are meant to “prevent future 
harm and to encourage voluntary compliance.”179  The Internal Revenue
Code penalties are applied retroactively, whereas Circular 230 is meant to 
prevent noncompliance from the start. 
Again, the court found the plaintiffs’ argument more persuasive.180  The
court held that the IRS’s interpretation of the statute did not make sense 
in the broader statutory scheme.181  If section 330(b) applied to tax return
preparers, then “the IRS would have the discretion—with few restraints— 
to impose an array of penalties.”182  The court determined the general
penalty scheme of section 330(b) should not be interpreted to allow the 
IRS to punish tax return preparers because the provisions found in the 
Internal Revenue Code already “set[] forth a comprehensive scheme
targeting specific problems with specific solutions.”183  If the general 
penalty scheme applies to tax return preparers, there is potential for 
177. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 31. 
Additionally, the IRS argued that the overall statutory scheme does not preclude the IRS 
from regulating under 31 U.S.C. § 330. Id. at 26–27; see, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 
609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that the SEC possesses the statutory authority
to regulate, despite several provisions that create remedies for violations of securities
laws).
178. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 31.  The 
IRS also points out that none of that statutes found within the penalty scheme of the 
Internal Revenue Code require tax return preparers to prove they are competent. Id. at 30– 
31. 
179. Id. at 31. The IRS further contended that the existence of enforcement 
proceedings under I.R.C. § 7407 demonstrates the need for competency standards.  Id. at
32 (citing United States v. Cruz, 611 F.3d 880, 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2010)) (holding that 
repeated violations of the Internal Revenue Code warranted injunctions under § 7407). 
180. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 2014); see Lipton, supra note 142, at 202. 
181. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 77. The court followed the general-specific canon, 
which states that where there are two interrelated statutes, the specific statute governs the 
general statute.  HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (“[I]t is a basic 
principle of statutory construction that a specific statute . . . controls over a general
provision . . . particularly when the two are interrelated and closely positioned . . . .”). In 
this case, there were already specific statutes in place; therefore, the general statute was
unnecessary.
182. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 77; see supra Part III.C.  This demonstrates the
potential for overpenalization. The court is concerned that the lack of judicial oversight 
may lead to problems for tax return preparers that they would not have to worry about 
under the Internal Revenue Code. 
183. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 77. 
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overpenalization because the IRS may sidestep the stringent judicial
review requirements.184 
3. The Outcome 
The district court ultimately granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment and request for declaratory and injunctive relief.185  The court 
found the IRS acted outside of its statutory authority when it implemented
the new regulations and permanently enjoined the IRS from enforcing the 
regulations.186 
Not surprisingly, the IRS appealed the decision.187  Pending appeal, the
IRS moved to stay the permanent injunction, which would allow it to 
move forward with the new regulations and require tax return preparers to
register for the upcoming tax year.188  However, both the D.C. District
 184. See Lipton, supra note 142, at 204 (“If the preparation of tax returns were 
covered under section 330, however, the IRS could avoid the limitation imposed by
Section 7407 and simply use its inherent authority to disbar or suspend the practitioner.”). 
185. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 80–81. 
186. Id. at 77.  The plaintiffs passed the four-factor test for a permanent injunction:
(1) they suffered an irreparable injury because they will likely have to close their 
businesses; (2) the remedies available are inadequate to recover from that injury; (3) the
balance of hardships between the plaintiffs and the IRS tips strongly in favor of the 
plaintiffs; and (4) the public interest would be served by a permanent injunction.  See 
Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 80 ̶ 81 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 393–94 (2006)). 
187. In its appellate brief, the IRS argued the district court erred because it refused
to go beyond Chevron step one.  See Brief for the Appellants at 35–36, Loving v. IRS, 917 
F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-5061).  The IRS argued that this case turns on 
Chevron step two and that its interpretation of practice allows it to “rationally implement 
the goals” of tax return preparer regulations. Id. at 53. In plaintiffs’ response appellate 
brief, they argued the district court made the right decision and that Congress has clearly
denied the IRS the authority to regulate by establishing its own set of rules. See Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 36–37, 43, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 
13-5061). On September 24, 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral 
arguments, and commentators noted the judges seemed skeptical of the IRS’s arguments 
and appeared unconvinced the IRS had the authority to regulate tax return preparers. See
Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Beats a Dead Horse, Argues for Regulations at Appeals Court, 
FORBES (Sept. 25, 2013, 2:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2013/ 
09/25/irs-beats-a-dead-horse-argues-for-regulations-at-appeals-court/ [https://perma.cc/MW9P
-E9ML?type=pdf]; Lauren French, IRS Claim To Regulate Tax Preparers Has Rough Day 
in Court, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2013, 5:18 AM), http://www.politico.com/ story/2013/09/ 
irs-tax-preparers-dc-appellate-court-97291.html [http://perma.cc/5TTN-LF46]. 
188. Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying the IRS’s 
motion to suspend injunction pending appeal).
 259























   
 
 
   
  






Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the motion, holding
the IRS had not satisfied the strict requirements for a stay pending 
appeal.189 
On February 11, 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an
opinion affirming the District Court’s decision.190  The Court of Appeals 
held the statute’s plain text and context “foreclose[d] and render[ed] 
unreasonable the IRS’s interpretation of Section 330.”191 
C. Why the District Court and the Court of Appeals Got it Right
The D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals were 
correct in finding the IRS did not have the statutory authority to impose 
regulations on tax return preparers.  The current dominant approach to
cases challenging an agency’s discretion and authority is to scrupulously 
examine the agency’s action under Chevron step one to determine whether
the statute is unambiguous as to the action.192  For example, in a recent 
Supreme Court case, the court recommended “taking seriously, and applying 
rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on an agencies’ authority.”193 This
is consistent with the notion that the Chevron analysis “has become largely
a device for maintaining congressional primacy in contested matters of
statutory meaning.”194  Thus, in cases where the Chevron doctrine applies,
the reviewing court should reject the agency’s interpretation of a statute 
189. Id. at 110 (“To assess the propriety of a stay pending appeal, the Court looks to
four factors: ‘(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of
the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a 
stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the 
public interest in granting the stay.’” (quoting Cuomo v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir 1985))). 
190.  Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
191. Id. at 1021–22. 
192. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 21. 
193. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1864, 1874 (2013) (holding that 
courts must apply the Chevron framework to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory 
ambiguity that concerns the scope of its authority). 
194. Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 727, 743 (2009).  Professor Beerman argues that the Court has moved away from 
the “deference to agency statutory interpretations toward a more traditional Court-centered 
approach with the focus on congressional intent.” Id. at 747.  This means that the scope 
of Chevron’s first step—to determine if Congress has directly spoken to the issue—has 
expanded to allow courts to use “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to determine
Congress’s intent.” Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).  This 
expansive view of step one allows courts to decide cases “even with little or no indication 
that Congress focused on the particular issue” and means that “in more situations, courts 
will overrule agency interpretations as inconsistent with what the court finds to be clear 
congressional intent.”  Id. at 747–49. 
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under Chevron step one when “the agency has gone against Congress’s 
intent or at least its more general preferences.”195 
Here, the court correctly followed the current dominant approach to 
Chevron and conducted the step one inquiry in an exacting fashion, 
relying on other portions of the statute as well as other statutes to reach
the conclusion that practice was unambiguous in the context. “Congress 
has established a clear line” and the IRS cannot go beyond that line, the
court reasoned.196  Both courts relied on the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, such as the plain meaning of the text and the broader 
statutory context, to determine that Congress did not intend to give the
IRS the authority to regulate tax return preparers when it enacted 31 
U.S.C. § 330.197 
As for overpenalization, the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals expressed apprehension about the IRS’s general penalty 
scheme under § 330(b).198  The district court worried that the IRS could 
impose harsh penalties with little restraint,199 and the court of appeals was
troubled by the fact that the IRS would have free rein to impose penalties 
for a broad array of misconduct.200  This indicates the courts recognized
the potential for the IRS to abuse the general penalty scheme and hand out
harsher penalties than it otherwise could under the Internal Revenue 
Code’s more specific penalty scheme.201  The courts’ recognition of this
 195. Id. at 750. 
196. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
197. Judges are not experts in the field of tax return preparers and therefore should 
not make their decisions on their own personal policy preferences.  In fact, “Congress has 
delegated policymaking responsibilities” to the IRS because it is the agency “charged with
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”  Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); see Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014); Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
198. See Loving, 742 F.3d at 1020–22; Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 79–80. 
199. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (“Yet if § 330 covers tax return preparers, the 
IRS would have the discretion—with few restraints—to impose an array of penalties.”). 
200. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1020 (“The IRS, by virtue of its heretofore undiscovered
carte blanche grant of authority from Section 330, would already have had free rein to 
impose an array of penalties on any tax return preparer who ‘is incompetent,’ ‘is 
disreputable,’ [and] ‘violates regulations prescribed under’ Section 330 . . . .”).
201. Congress should take caution and beware that under the IRS’s proposed 
interpretation of § 330, the agency could “sidestep every protection § 7407 affords—
judicial review, the demanding standards for the extraordinary remedy of an injunction,
and the elevated hurdle for enjoining preparation of tax returns.” Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d 
at 78.
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issue should put Congress on notice that a more limited penalty scheme,
one that aligns with the already well-established penalty scheme, is necessary
when implementing new legislation.
Additionally, the courts correctly rejected the policy arguments because 
Chevron step one does not turn on policy.202  If the statute unambiguously 
precludes the IRS from regulating tax return preparers, then it is irrelevant 
whether it should have the authority to do so—that is a question for
Congress to decide.  However, the holdings of these cases augur in favor 
of congressional action.203 Although the courts found Congress did not
intend to give the IRS the authority to regulate tax return preparers based 
on a 130-year-old statute, this does not mean Congress does not intend to 
give the IRS the authority to do so now.204  Because the IRS currently 
lacks the authority to act, the courts’ rulings should act as an invitation for 
congressional action, alerting Congress to the fact that there are problems 
with unregulated tax return preparers and something needs to be done to
solve these problems.205 
V. THE FUTURE OF TAX RETURN PREPARER REGULATION
The eventual regulation of all tax return preparers is inevitable.206 
Considering the recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision, Congress 
202. See id. at 79.
 203. Erb, supra note 80 (“Of course, since the legal basis for the ruling indicated that 
the power to regulate preparers had to come from Congress and not the IRS . . . .”). 
204. Congress will likely give the policy arguments great weight in the fight for
regulations because its job is to weigh these factors in deciding whether or not to regulate 
tax return preparers.  In the legislative arena, policy is paramount.  See Katherine M.
Hetherington, Regulation of Paid Tax-Return Preparers: A Forgone Conclusion Regardless of
the Result in the Loving Case, SUFFOLK U. L. REV. ONLINE 117–18 (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://suffolklawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Hetherington-Essay.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/P44U-QDTD].
205. In fact, the Court of Appeals went so far as to say, “It might be that allowing
the IRS to regulate tax return preparers more stringently would be wise as a policy matter.”
Loving, 742 F.3d at 1022.  However, the court ultimately left that decision up to Congress.
Id. 
206. The plaintiffs may regret the day they challenged the IRS’s authority to regulate 
tax return preparers because it is widely believed that their regulation is inevitable.  The 
legislature is aware of the issue and was patiently waiting for the court of appeals to make
its decision.  Now that the court has ruled on the issue, it is only a matter of time before 
Congress takes action. See, e.g., Simplifying the Tax System for Families and Businesses:
Senate Finance Committee Staff Tax Reform Options for Discussion, U.S. SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON FIN. 3 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
032113%20Tax%20Administration%20Options%20Paper%20for%20Member%20Meeting
%20.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ES6-P452] (“If the IRS does not prevail in its appeal of the 
Loving case, it will lose an important tool to increase tax compliance and protect taxpayers
from unethical tax return preparers.”); see also Alvarez, supra note 63, at 757 (“Whether
the DDC’s Loving decision is upheld or overturned, it is inevitable that the group of tax
262
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will probably act quickly to grant the IRS the authority to regulate.207 
However, Congress will need to be aware of the potential for harsh 
penalties when it enacts new legislation.208  The legislation should 
specifically address the issue of overpenalization for tax return preparers
and limit the IRS’s authority to penalize by aligning the penalty schemes 
found in the Internal Revenue Code and the Dead Horse Act of 1884. 
A. Previously Proposed Legislation 
Since 2005, nine bills have been introduced to amend the 1884 Dead
Horse Act to allow the IRS to regulate tax return preparers; all have died
either upon introduction or in committee.209  This not only strengthens the
argument that the IRS did not have authority to implement the new 
regulations but also demonstrates Congress was not necessarily eager to 
grant the authority necessary to regulate tax return preparers.210 
return preparers targeted by the IRS will eventually be regulated.”); Hetherington, supra
note 204, at 123 (“[P]erhaps a judicial defeat is exactly what the legislature is waiting for 
to give the IRS express statutory authority for its RTRP program.”); Lipton, supra note 
142, at 205 (“[A]ny future rules concerning tax return preparers emanating from Congress 
could make the Service’s Regulations appear to be mild.”).
207. See Ashlea Ebeling, Appellate Court Delivers Blow to IRS and Taxpayers 
Nixing Tax Return Preparer Regs, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/ashleaebeling/2014/02/11/appellate-court-delivers-blow-to-irs-and-taxpayers-
nixing-tax-return-preparer-regs/ [https://perma.cc/Z5NW-5RQS?type=pdf].
208. See supra text accompanying notes 200–201. 
209. See Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act of 2013, H.R. 1570, 
113th Cong. § 2 (2013); Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 6050, 112th Cong. § 
202 (2012); Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2012, S. 3355, 112th Cong. § 202 (2012); 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2010, H.R. 5047, 111th Cong. § 202 (2010); Taxpayer Bill 
of Rights Act of 2010, S. 3215, 111th Cong. § 202 (2010); Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of
2008, H.R. 5716, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008); Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 
2007, S. 1219, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); Telephone Excise Tax Repeal and Taxpayer
Protection and Assistance Act of 2006, S. 1321, 109th Cong. § 203 (2006); Taxpayer
Protection and Assistance Act of 2005, S. 832, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005). 
210. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e find at least 
some significance in the fact that multiple Congresses have acted as if Section 330 did not 
extend so broadly as to cover tax return preparers.”); see also Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 132, at 42 (“That Congress has not done so despite 
numerous recent bills indicates that it has not reached any consensus to grant such 
authority; the IRS thus has no congressional authorization to regulate in this manner.”).
But see Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994)
(explaining that the views or understandings of later Congresses are not dispositive and 
can sometimes be a hazardous basis for interpreting the meaning of an earlier enacted 
statute). 
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Although the previously proposed legislation aimed for the same goal
as the Dead Horse Act—to regulate tax return preparers—the bills varied 
according to how they planned to achieve this goal.  The earlier bills 
appeared more detailed and offered a well organized outline of the regulations
and steps the IRS can take in regulating tax return preparers.211  On the
other hand, the bills proposed after the new regulations were introduced 
and implemented were far less detailed and left more room for the IRS to 
implement the new regulations as it saw fit.212 
The regulations introduced in 2009 embodied the basic concept of the 
previously proposed legislation213: to amend the Internal Revenue Code
to authorize the IRS to take steps that would provide taxpayers additional
protection and assistance.214 
B. Proposed Legislation 
In light of the recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision, Congress
will clearly need to enact new legislation in order for the IRS to regulate 
tax return preparers.215  This proposed legislation should focus on two 
main goals: (1) granting the IRS the authority to regulate, and (2) limiting 
the penalties that tax return preparers may face. 
In order to accomplish the proposed legislation’s dual goals, three main 
provisions are proposed. The first and perhaps most important provision 
would grant the IRS the authority to regulate tax return preparers.216  The
 211. See, e.g., S. 832 § 4.  The earlier bills also seem to address the important issue 
of overlap found within the penalty subsections of § 330(b) and the Internal Revenue Code. 
See, e.g., S. 1219 § 4 (limiting the monetary penalty that can be imposed for noncompliance
with the regulations); S. 832 § 4(d)(2) (describing how the funds collected from penalties 
will be used).
212. Compare S. 832 § 4 (outlining a more complex version of the bill, particularly
the examination process and continuing education requirements), with H.R. 6050 § 202 
(describing a more simple version of the bill, generally outlining the promulgation of
regulations).
213. See S. 832 § 4; I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 32. 
214. The summary of each proposed bill states a very similar purpose—a bill to
amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide taxpayer protection and assistance.  See, e.g., 
H.R. 6050 § 202; H.R. 5047 § 202; S. 1219 § 4; S. 1321 § 203; S. 832 § 4.
215. See supra note 206. 
216. See S. 832 § 4(a) (granting the IRS authorization to regulate). Senator Max 
Baucus of Montana introduced the Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2005 in 
response to Congress’s plan to reduce taxpayer access to assistance and services. Press 
Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Baucus Works To Increase Taxpayers Assistance
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=6b884146-1ae5-
4eb6-ac5f-fd92e7bb77b3 [http://perma.cc/N8TA-2LB3].  Baucus stated the proposed legislation 
would “make it easier to give millions of taxpayers more assistance and will promote
ethical and competent service by tax preparers.” Id. 
264
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second provision would detail the requirements the IRS may implement.217 
Lastly, the third provision would limit the penalties that can be enforced
under § 330(b) and align them with the Internal Revenue Code penalty 
scheme.218 
1. Authorization
The main goal of the new legislation is to grant the IRS the necessary 
authority to regulate tax return preparers.219  The previously proposed
legislation tried to add some version of the phrase “compensated preparers
of Federal tax returns” to § 330(a)(1) after the term “representatives.”220 
The amended statute would read: “regulate the practice of representatives
including tax return preparers of Federal tax returns.”221  This reading of
the statute, however, is contrary to the holding of Loving because in that 
case, the court found tax return preparers do not “practice” before the 
IRS.222 
In order to remain consistent with Loving and accomplish the goal of 
regulating tax return preparers, the grant of authority must be found in a 
provision separate from § 330(a)(1).223  The new legislation should be
modeled after the Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act 
of 2013 because it specifically addressed the problem of implementing the 
217. See, e.g., S. 832 § 4(b) (stating the requirements that the new regulations will
necessitate).
218. See id. § 4(d) (discussing allowable penalties if the regulations are not followed). 
219. See Alvarez, supra note 63, at 757. 
220. Instead of trying to add a new provision granting the authority to regulate, 
versions of the bill before the Loving decision proposed to add this phase to the statute. 
See, e.g., Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 6050, 112th Cong. § 202(a) (2012); 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2010, H.R. 5047, 111th Cong. § 202(a) (2010); Taxpayer 
Protection and Assistance Act of 2007, S. 1219, 110th Cong. § 4(a) (2007); Telephone 
Excise Tax Repeal and Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2006, S. 1321, 109th 
Cong. § 203(a) (2006); S. 832 § 4(a). 
221. This simple change could solve a larger problem and may be the easiest way
for Congress to authorize the IRS to regulate instead of enacting a completely new piece 
of legislation.  It has become increasingly difficult to enact new legislation, and there is a 
possibility that, with Congress’s heavy workload, the need for tax preparer regulation
might be overlooked. See Alvarez, supra note 63, at 758. 
222.  Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
223. See, e.g., Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act of 2013, H.R.
1570, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). 
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new regulations.224  Instead of amending § 330(a)(1) to grant the IRS the
authorization to regulate tax return preparers, the bill introduced a 
completely new provision to § 330.225  The new provision granted the IRS
the authority to “regulate tax return preparers who do not practice as
representatives” before the IRS.226  By following this approach, Congress
would avoid any confusion about whether tax return preparers are practicing 
representatives.  Therefore, the newly proposed legislation should grant
the authority to regulate tax return preparers in a provision separate from 
the one granting authority to regulate representatives who “practice”
before the IRS. 
2. Requirements 
Next, the new legislation must carefully outline the requirements the
IRS can impose on tax return preparers.  This will help police the IRS so
it may not over-regulate and will serve to limit the regulations that it can 
implement.227 Congress should specify the regulations the IRS can
promulgate under its newly granted authority.228  The earlier versions of
the previously proposed legislation do a good job detailing the requirements
of regulated tax return preparers.229  The newly proposed legislation
should follow this method of implementing the requirements. 
224. Id. The Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act of 2013 was
introduced by Congressman Cedric Richmond of Louisiana in response to the D.C. District 
Court’s holding in Loving. Press Release, Congressman Cedric Richmond, Rep. Richmond 
Introduces Legislation To Combat Tax Preparer Fraud (Apr. 15, 2013), http://richmond.
house.gov/press-release/rep-richmond-introduces-legislation-combat-tax-preparer-fraud [http://
perma.cc/N672-FK4H].  Richmond stated the purpose of the bill was to “provide the IRS 
with tools to ensure consumers are choosing from only the most competent pool of
preparers when it is time to file their return.” Id. 
225.  H.R. 1570 § 2. 
226. Id.  By inserting the phrase, “or tax return preparer” after “representative” in 
§ 330(b), this version of the bill goes even further and clarifies that tax return preparers
and representatives are two distinct groups.  Id. 
227. Congressional oversight of the IRS is important to ensure that the IRS is doing
its job by implementing the Internal Revenue Code. See Archie Parnell, Congressional
Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1365–66 
(1980). Congress has the responsibility to inquire into the activities and make suggestions 
to the IRS. Id. at 1368. The IRS must be accountable to Congress, but at the same time
the IRS has the constitutional duty to faithfully execute the tax laws, and there is
sometimes tension between these two duties. Id. This conflict was seen in the Loving
case, where the IRS believed it was carrying out its duties under the tax code. See Loving, 
742 F.3d at 1014–15. 
228. See, e.g., Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2010, H.R. 5047, 111th Cong. § 202(b) 
(2010); Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2007, S. 1219, 110th Cong. § 4(b)
(2007).
229. For example, the Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2007 contained a 
very detailed requirements provision. See S. 1219 § 4(b). The examination requirement 
266
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The first requirement should detail the eligibility examinations.  Similar 
to the regulations proposed in 2009, tax return preparers should be 
required to pass an eligibility examination that demonstrates their knowledge 
of the applicable federal tax laws.230  The new legislation should allow the
IRS to develop and administer eligibility examinations that are designed
to test the preparers’ knowledge of how to prepare a federal tax return for 
both individuals and businesses.231  The examination should also test for
knowledge of the ethical standards determined by the IRS.232  This will 
help ensure that tax return preparers understand the complexities of the
tax code and the ethical standards expected of them.233 
The next requirement should outline the continuing education provision 
for tax return preparers.  The details of this requirement should be left up 
to the IRS and should generally state that continuing education is required.234 
The early versions of the previously proposed legislation defer to the IRS 
for the specifics of the continuing education requirements and require only 
that tax return preparers “show evidence of completion of such continuing
stated, “In promulgating the regulations . . . the Secretary shall develop (or approve) and
administer an eligibility examination designed to test” both the technical knowledge and 
the knowledge of ethical standards. Id. § 4(b)(2)(A).  Specifically, the technical 
knowledge portion of the examination tested whether tax return preparers knew how to 
“prepare Federal tax returns, including individual and business income tax returns” and
“properly claim the earned income tax credit under section 32 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 with respect to such individual returns.”  Id. § 4(b)(2)(A)(i).  Similarly, the 
ethical knowledge portion tested whether tax return preparers knew the “ethical standards
for the preparation of such returns as determined appropriate by the Secretary.” Id. §
4(b)(2)(A)(ii). The continuing education requirement stated that, “As part of the renewal 
of eligibility, such regulations shall require that each preparer show evidence of completion of
such continuing education requirements as specified by the Secretary.” Id. § 4(b)(3)(B). 
230. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 31. 
231. See, e.g., H.R. 5047 § 202(c)(1)(B) (“One such examination shall be designed 
to test technical knowledge and competency to prepare individual returns, and the other 
examination shall be designed to test technical knowledge and competency to prepare 
business income tax returns.”).
232. See S. 1219 § 4(b)(2)(A)(ii).
233. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 13, at 31. 
234. In the previously proposed legislation, the IRS was given great deference in this
area and only the very basics are outlined, specifically trying avoiding details, as the IRS 
is in a better position than Congress to determine what will work as far as continuing 
education requirements are concerned.  See, e.g., H.R. 5047 §§ 202(c)(1)(B), 202(c)(3)(B); 
S. 1219 § 4(b)(3). 
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education or testing requirements.”235  Ideally, the IRS should control the
specifics of the continuing education requirements because it is difficult 
to say what will and will not work.  By allowing the IRS the discretion to 
determine the necessary requirements for continuing education, it will be 
easier for the IRS to change its procedures if they prove ineffective instead
of going through the daunting administrative process once again. 
However, some states and employers already require that tax return 
preparers pass eligibility examinations and participate in continuing 
education courses similar to those that will be required by the IRS.236  In
cases where the states’ or employers’ examinations and continuing education 
requirements are analogous, they should be used in place of the federally 
mandated regulations.  The 2007 and 2010 versions of the previously
proposed legislation contain a “grandfather” provision, which allows the 
IRS to accept the eligibility examinations of states or other organizations 
in lieu of its examination, but only if they are deemed “comparable.”237
 235. See, e.g., H.R. 5047 § 202(c)(1)(B); S. 1219 § 4(b); Telephone Excise Tax
Repeal and Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2006, S. 1321, 109th Cong. § 203
(2006); Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2005, S. 832, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005). 
236. For example, tax return preparers in New York are required to register annually, 
obtain an identification number, and pay a $100 fee.  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION &
FIN., PUB. NO. 58, INFORMATION FOR INCOME TAX RETURN PREPARERS FOR TAX YEAR 
2012, at 5, 7 (2013), http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/income/pub58.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/4LA3-XKYU?type=pdf].  In California, tax return preparers are required to complete 
at least sixty hours of tax education, purchase a $5000 tax preparer bond, obtain a PTIN 
from the IRS, and submit an application before they can become a registered preparer.
California Tax Education Council (CTEC) Registered Tax Preparers,  CAL. FRANCHISE
TAX BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/professionals/ registered_tax_preparers.shtml [https://perma.cc/
CZ29-QSQR] (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).  In order to keep their registration, tax return 
preparers must complete at least twenty hours of continuing education classes annually,
renew their PTIN, and submit a renewal application.  Id.  At the time this Comment was 
written, Oregon was the only state to require an examination.  OR. BD. OF TAX PRACTITIONERS,
GENERAL INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR TAX CONSULTANT AND TAX PREPARER APPLICANTS
3 (2013), http://www.oregon.gov/OBTP/docs/Form/gen_info.pdf [http://perma.cc/DPP3-
EAU6].  Before tax return preparers can take the eligibility examination they must
complete eighty hours of basic tax courses and score at least a seventy-five percent on the 
examination to obtain their license. Id; see I.R.S. PUB. NO. 4832, supra note 11, at 33–36;
Alvarez, supra note 63, at 759–60.  H&R Block is an example of an employer that requires 
eligibility examinations and continuing education courses. Pickering, supra note 89, at 46. 
237. See, e.g., H.R. 5047 § 202(c)(1)(B) (“The Secretary is authorized to accept an 
individual as meeting the eligibility examination requirement of this section if, in lieu of
the eligibility examination under this section, the individual passed a State licensing or 
State registration program eligibility examination that the Secretary determines is
comparable to either of the eligibility examinations described in subparagraph (B) if such 
exam is administered within 5 years after the date of issuance of the regulations under this
section.”); S. 1219 § 4(b)(2)(B) (“The Secretary is authorized to accept an individual as
meeting the eligibility examination requirement of this section if, in lieu of the eligibility
examination under this section, the individual passed—a State licensing or State registration 
program eligibility examination that is comparable to the eligibility examination established by
268
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The new legislation needs to extend this grandfather provision to
include continuing education requirements.  By allowing the IRS to accept 
an equivalent form of these requirements, Congress could avoid the problem 
of redundancy.238  A grandfather provision could also reduce costs for tax
return preparers.239  If tax return preparers are already required to pass a
test and participate in a continuing education course, then it is unnecessary
to make them take the same test twice or require further continuing
education.
3. Penalties
In order to achieve the second goal of the proposed legislation— 
restricting the penalty scheme—the new bill needs to contain a provision 
limiting the penalties that can be imposed on tax return preparers for
failing to comply with the regulations.  As the penalty scheme under 
§ 330(b)(1) now reads, the IRS may “impose a monetary penalty” or 
“suspend or disbar from practice” anyone who fails to comply with the
regulations.240 Therefore, in accordance with the holding in Loving, tax 
return preparers are not subject to these penalties because they do not
“practice” before the IRS.241  There should, however, be some sort of 
penalty for failing to comply with the regulations. 
The 2013 version of the previously proposed legislation amended 
§ 330(b) to include the term “tax return preparer” after “representative,”
so that the newly regulated tax return preparers would be subject to the
the Secretary, or an eligibility examination administered by an existing organization for 
tax return preparers that is comparable to the eligibility examination established by the
Secretary if such test was administered prior to the issuance or regulations under this
section.”).
238. The opposition believes the requirements are redundant; adding a grandfather 
provision might put them at ease.  A grandfather provision would allow those already
required to take a test and participate in continued education to bypass this requirement, 
while at the same time requiring those who do not have to participate in such tests and 
continuing education programs to demonstrate competency. See Tolan, supra note 47, at 
514; supra Part III.B. 
239. The problems of redundancy and cost go hand in hand.  If redundancy is 
minimized, then costs are reduced because less people would have to complete the testing 
and education requirements.  Tolan, supra note 47, at 513–14. 
240.  31 U.S.C. § 330(b)(1) (2012). 
241. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Loving v. IRS, 
917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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same penalties as those who “practice” before the IRS.242  This includes  
disbarment and other monetary sanctions on top of the penalties tax return 
preparers already face under the Internal Revenue Code.243  This is the
problem that the proposed legislation seeks to avoid. 
The best approach to dealing with overpenalization is to add a new 
provision following the requirements provision.  This provision should be 
modeled after the 2007 version of the bill, which granted the IRS the 
authority to impose a $1000 penalty for each federal tax return prepared
by a preparer who is not in compliance with the above-mentioned
requirements.244  This is appropriate because it limits the penalty the IRS 
can impose on tax return preparers who are not in compliance with the 
regulations.  Another advantage to creating a new penalty provision 
specifically for tax return preparers is that it would not subject preparers
to suspension or disbarment.245  The Internal Revenue Code already has a
section that specifically addresses the issue of enjoining tax return 
preparers.246 
To solve this issue, the legislation should add a provision to Internal 
Revenue Code § 7407(b)(1) that would allow tax return preparers to be 
enjoined for failing to comply with the regulations under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330.247  This solution is ideal because it provides tax return preparers 
with the protection of judicial review if they are enjoined from preparing 
taxes.248 Under § 330(b), the Secretary may suspend or disbar from
practice a tax return preparer who is incompetent, disreputable, or who
violates regulations only after “notice and opportunity for a proceeding,” 
which does not necessarily mean a formal judicial hearing.249  However, 
under § 7407, there is a guarantee that “[a]ny action under this section
242. Under the Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act of 2013, 
§ 330(b) would read, “After notice and opportunity for a proceeding, the Secretary may
suspend or disbar from practice before the Department, or censure, a representative or tax
return preparer . . . .  The Secretary may impose a monetary penalty on any representative
or tax return preparer . . . .” See Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act
of 2013, H.R. 1570, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2013). 
243.  31 U.S.C. § 330(b); I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695, 7206, 7216, 7407 (2012). 
244. Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2007, S. 1219, 110th Cong.
§ 4(b)(4) (2007) (“In promulgating the regulations . . . the Secretary shall impose a penalty
of $1000 for each Federal tax return, document, or other submission prepared by a 
preparer . . . who is not in compliance with the requirements . . . .”).
245.  31 U.S.C. § 330(b)(1). 
246.  I.R.C. § 7407.
247. Id.  The new provision would be found under § 7407(b)(1)(E) and would read
something like, “engaged in conduct consider to be disreputable or in violation of the 
regulations prescribed in 31 U.S.C. § 330.” 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 106–110. 
249. 31 U.S.C. § 330(b)(1); Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2013), 
aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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shall be brought in [a] District Court of the United States.”250  Therefore, 
by adding a provision that permits enjoinment of tax return preparers who
do not comply with the regulations under the Internal Revenue Code, the 
IRS can prevent ineligible tax return preparers from preparing taxes, and 
the tax return preparers would have the protection of judicial review. 




Although this proposed legislation may achieve the goal of granting the 
IRS the authority to regulate tax return preparers and limiting the penalties 
they may face, one disadvantage may be the legislation’s complexity.251 
The proposed legislation may look too much like an all-encompassing
instruction manual on how the IRS should regulate tax return preparers.252 
This approach may be too detailed and complex to be an effective piece
of legislation by placing too many restrictions on the IRS’s duty to 
regulate.253  For example, the requirements provision may proscribe an
overly detailed set of rules for eligibility examinations and continuing 
education. The IRS could find these requirements are a completely 
ineffective way of ensuring tax return preparers are competent and that a
different method works much better.254  Instead, it should be Congress’s 
250.  I.R.C. § 7407. 
251. The rules in isolation may seem to be a simple, reasonable request; however, 
when collectively taken as a whole they could impose a huge burden on the IRS.  See
Over-Regulated America, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21547789 [http://perma.cc/27HL-JPY4] (“America is meant to be the home of laissez-
faire. . . . Americans are supposed to be free to choose, for better or for worse.”). 
252. See id.  America has become increasingly more dependent on the federal 
government, and this has resulted in more complex federal regulations in areas that were 
not traditionally regulated.  There are currently 4062 new regulations at various stages of
implementation before Congress.  Niall Ferguson, The Regulated States of America, WALL
ST. J. (June 18, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/ articles/SB10001424127
887324021104578551291160259734 [http://perma.cc/WQ5V-4JJ6].
253. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 14 (“Some have decried the challenged regulations
as another step in the over-regulation of America.”); Over-Regulated America, supra note 
251. 
254. This is different from leaving the specifics of the requirements up to the IRS.
This would mean leaving the requirements themselves up to the IRS to decide and only
outlining the goal of the requirements to ensure tax return preparers are competent. See
supra Part V.B.2. 
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job to outline the broad goals of the legislation and it should be the IRS’s 
job to structure the regulations the way it sees fit.255 
On the other hand, a more detailed proposed legislation allows Congress
to place greater limits on the IRS’s regulation of tax return preparers.  It
also allows for a clearer idea of Congress’s intent.256  Congress has an
interest in ensuring that federal agencies, such as the IRS, are run in an 
efficient manner.257  By proposing more complex and detailed legislation,
Congress can ensure the IRS will not overpenalize tax return preparers.
For example, without detailed legislation limiting the IRS’s ability to 
enjoin or disbar tax return preparers, the IRS would likely always choose
the less stringent form of disbarment practices under § 330(b) instead of
the judicially protected procedures under the Internal Revenue Code.258 
The proposed legislation needs to be complex enough to ensure this 
cannot happen, and it can do this by introducing a happy medium between
the two extremes: allowing the IRS to maintain the ability to disbar tax 
return preparers for failure to comply with the regulations while at the same 
time offering the necessary judicial oversight to help protect tax return
preparers from overpenalization. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In 2015, over 130 years after the passage of the Dead Horse Act of 1884, 
Congress is facing the same problems it had at the end of the Civil War.
However, instead of citizens trying to collect for the loss of their property,
taxpayers are trying to collect their refunds, and the IRS is trying to collect 
their taxes. Studies have shown that unregulated tax return preparers are
adding to the problem of taxpayer noncompliance and the increasing tax 
gap. It is apparent that Congress needs to take action if tax return 
preparers are to be regulated.  However, in regulating tax return preparers, 
Congress must recognize the potential for overpenalizing those who fail
to comply with these regulations.  The proposed legislation aims to remedy 
this problem by granting the IRS the authority to regulate and aligning the
penalty schemes.
 255. See Over-Regulated America, supra note 251. 
256. This was a big deal in the Loving case; if Congress had made their intentions 
more clear, the case would likely not have been brought.  Detailed legislation could help
prevent this issue in the future. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
257. See Lee Hamilton, True Congressional Oversight, CENTER ON CONGRESS IND.
U. (May 16, 2000), http://congress.indiana.edu/true-congressional-oversight [http://perma.cc/ 
P68Q-JN72].
258. See Loving, 742 F.3d at 1020. 
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